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ntroduction
Big History (BH) is about developing a creation 
myth and origin story suitable to our globalized world 
characterised by (i) economic growth and ecological 
deterioration and (ii) by the existence of weapons of 
mass destruction and other risks. The idea is that this 
story must and can accord with modern science and 
its findings. The story must also be open to critique, 
revision and improvement. So far, the starting point 
has been that the Big Bang cosmology provides us 
with a scientific creation myth. The metatheory of 
emergence and complexity fills in the  rest of the story.1 
1 David Christian, Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big His-
tory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), especially 
1-20, 505-511. The basic idea is summarized neatly in a 2014 
textbook: “[…] there is a single thread that runs through the 
whole story: the emergence, over the 13.8 billion years since the 
universe appeared, of more and more complex things. Complex 
things have many diverse components that are arranged in pre-
A difficulty is that modern science has been set 
against all myths. The standard modern meaning of 
myth has been that of a narrative that has no basis in 
reason and cannot be true. Mythos is opposed to logos. 
It is well known that Giambattista Vico argued already 
in the early 18th century that human civilization is 
based on the emergent capacity to imagine, through 
complex language, and thus to create something 
new.2 Since the time when humans transcended basic 
physical impulses with the help of language, we have 
cise ways so that they generate new qualities. We call these new 
qualities emergent properties”. David Christian, Cynthia Stokes 
Brown, and Craig Benjamin, Big History: Between Nothing and 
Everything (New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2014), 4. For a 
systematic theoretical exposition of emergence as combogenesis 
and of twelve major steps of emergence, see Volk, Tyler, Quarks 
to Culture. How We Came to Be (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 2017).
2  See e.g. Joseph Mali, The Rehabilitation of Myth: Vico’s 
‘New Science’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
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been making our own cultural and social worlds. 
Consciousness, society and history are 
mythopoetically constituted. If a myth is lived by 
people in their everyday practices and institutions, 
the resulting social order testifies to the truth of that 
myth. Hence, in order to know the human world, we 
must know its constitutive myths. For Vico, mythos 
and logos are mutually implicated. The Vicoan 
viewpoint needs to be rephrased, however, in terms of 
critical human sciences and epistemological, ethical 
and political pluralism. Critical science implies that 
beliefs can be wrong, even when they are constitutive 
of actions, practices and institutions. Pluralism 
means deep respect for other points of view, without 
relativism. As Nicholas Rescher explains:
There is no good reason why a recognition 
that others, circumstanced as they are, are 
rationally entitled in their circumstances to 
hold a position at variance with ours should 
be construed to mean that we, circumstanced 
as we are, need feel any rational obligation 
to abandon our position. In so far as one is 
rational (and no doubt not all of us are) one 
cannot see the alternatives as indifferent.3
Temporal reflexivity sensitises us to recognize 
that the constitution of consciousness and society 
occurs also mythopoetically.4 I argue in this paper 
3  Nicholas Rescher, Pluralism. Against the Demand for Con-
sensus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 119-20.
4 Reflective consciousness, which has enabled our current 
levels of social complexity, can be seen as an emergent power 
made possible by the evolvement of metaphors and mental lan-
guage and related social complexity rather late in human history 
(perhaps as late as during the Axial Age). This hypothesis may be 
controversial, but seems to me a plausible way of accounting for 
the existing archaeological and early historical evidence; Julian 
Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Break-Down of the 
Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000). For an alter-
native account of roughly the same change, see Iain McGilchrist, 
The Master and His Emissary (New Haven CT: Yale University 
Press, 2012), 260-6. Tyler, Quarks to Culture, 117-119 [note 1] 
that to be rational, the stories we are telling, involving 
anticipations of possible futures, must be open to 
criticism and revisable in a systematic fashion. 
Mythopoetic imagination can also be a means for 
critique of prevailing myths.5 In complex pluralist 
societies, there are hegemonic struggles over 
constitutive myths, shaping both our explanatory 
stories about the past and scenarios about possible 
futures.6 These myths can be addressed in various 
ways (empirical, theoretical etc) and at various levels 
of abstraction.
At the heart of BH is the common modern idea that 
with the development of science, God has been moved 
further and further away from the story of the origins 
of the cosmos (not to speak of causal interventions 
in it).7 From this starting point different stories have 
been developed. I argue that a basic underlying myth 
of contemporary liberal-capitalist societies consists 
of three temporal tiers: deep cosmic scepticism if 
not desperation; various lessons drawn from this 
scepticism and related ideologies, such as Darwinism8; 
and Yuval Noah Harari, Sapiens. A Brief History of Humankind 
(New York: HarperCollins, 2014), ch 2, locate the origin of full 
language earlier than Jaynes (70,000 – 30,000 BCE rather than 
25,000-15,000), but do not distinguish between full language and 
metaphorical language.
5 Chiara Bottici, A Philosophy of Political Myth (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007).
6 Robert W. Cox, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), e.g. 131.
7 Christian, Maps of Time, 22 [note 1]; thus God may be unli-
kely to frame 21st century debates about political theory, although 
this is an open question; see e.g. Heikki Patomäki, “From East to 
West: Emergent Global Philosophies – Beginnings of the End of 
the Western Dominance?,” Theory, Culture & Society 19 no. 3, 
(2002), 89-111.
8 Darwin’s theory of evolution is subject to many interpreta-
tions and it has been adopted to diverse purposes. It may be stres-
sed that ‘the struggle for existence’ often brings about adverse 
consequences and is thus not good as such; or that ‘survival of 
the fittest’ is not the only mechanism of evolution but rather evo-
lution is also about emergence of new forms of complexity. It 
may also be argued that when applied to society the mutation and 
selection conditions are social and more Lamarckian than Darwi-
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and the capacity of technology and economic growth 
to bring some comfort and enjoyment to our short 
lives. An alternative cosmic storyline centres on the 
prospects of life, rather than death, and on the promises 
of our common evolvement also through learning. In 
my ideal-typical schemes, I associate these life- and 
learning-oriented ideas with pragmatism and critical 
realism, although many of these alternative notions 
are shared much more widely.9 On the basis of the two 
ideal-typical storylines, I examine, compare and assess 
claims made within BH in terms of their scientific 
(logos) and narratological (mythos) plausibility. I 
show the ambiguities of the current BH narrative and 
envision a way forward.
On the narrative dimension of scientific 
explanations and futures scenarios
Temporality is fundamental to social actions and 
scientific explanations alike. According to Paul 
Ricouer, there is a unity of having-been, coming-
towards and making present, since these are thought 
and acted upon together by the actors. This is the 
nist. In this paper I purposefully associate Darwinism almost 
exclusively with those doctrines that tend to reduce evolution to 
‘struggle for survival’ or something analogical and either accept 
this mechanism as ‘natural’ also in society (or as given in some 
other manner) or elevate it to a principle that generates normative 
good or ‘optimal’ outcomes (for instance free market doctrines).
9 In this paper pragmatism is largely associated with Charles 
Peirce and William James and their followers; and critical rea-
lism is associated with Roy Bhaskar and the network of scholars 
who have been active in the International Association of Critical 
Realism (IACR). I rely more on the latter than the former, but 
there are many commonalities between the two. It is also impor-
tant to bear in mind that concepts such as emergence, causation, 
learning and normativity are best understood as open sites of dis-
cussions and developments, neither originating nor ending in any 
particular philosophy or theory. Instead of giving a long list of 
sources, I cite a specific article making the point that pragmatism 
covers much of the same ground as critical realism: Inanna Ha-
mati-Ataya, “Beyond (Post)Positivism: The Missed Promises of 
Systemic Pragmatism,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 2 
(2012), 291-305.
temporality of practical experience and action. The 
making-present of practical action stems from the 
anticipation of possibilities of transformative action 
producing outcomes on the basis of understanding of 
that which has-been (history). The horizon of action 
is thus inherently temporal.10 Many political projects 
derive their motivation from the sense they render 
to our/their lives. Moreover, the appeal of grand 
narratives tends to be reinforced by awareness of 
one’s own mortality.11 
Scientific explanations too have a temporal 
dimension. A researcher draws a meaningful story 
from a diversity of temporal events that are constitutive 
of episodes and processes. Emplotment combines 
two temporal dimensions. By stipulating causal 
hypotheses, one captures the episodic dimension of 
temporality and creates components of explanation 
that go beyond mere chronicle. By grasping together 
the whole of the episode, one constructs a narrative 
or a story proper, a story which has a counterfactual 
sense of ending. As processes continue and history 
remains open, this sense of ending must be artificially 
created (the end is unreal as processes continue).
Every scenario is a story which has motivating power 
or charisma because it gives (or fails to give) meaning 
to the lives of individuals, groups and/or humankind. 
It is therefore very important to recognise the deep 
structures in our culture according to which we tell 
stories and construct myths. Structures of meaning 
determine capacity to generate stories. Structures of 
meaning may be relatively enduring and widely shared 
across cultures, even though they are subject to cultural 
variations, historical change and learning. When put 
together, lesser-scale stories may presuppose or form 
a grand or cosmic narrative of the origins, possibilities 
10 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative Vol.1, trans. Kathleen 
McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1984), 68-84.
11 See Hayward Alker, Rediscoveries and Reformulations: Hu-
manistic methodologies for International Studies (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), e.g. 105, 269-70.
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and outlook for humankind. Every grand story locates 
the present context as part of a wider and structured 
temporal whole, thus organising our anticipations 
of possible futures at different scales of time. In our 
practical understandings and actions, grand stories 
become part of the Ricouerian triad of having-been, 
coming-towards and making present. Grand stories 
are in effect myths, i.e. “sacred” narratives explaining 
how the world and humankind came to be in their 
present form and what their future possibilities are. 
Value-laden narratives affect our perceptions 
also in scientific contexts. The claim that scientific 
expert opinion is driven by sense-making and story-
telling is evident in human sciences12, but it is 
true also for natural sciences13. The plausibility of 
theories, successful tests, or predictive success do 
not unequivocally determine rational adoption of 
theories in sciences, not even in physics or chemistry 
(although many established textbook-level theories 
are rightly seen as being beyond reasonable doubt in 
the sense that they have passed all tests and work well 
for practical purposes). 
The scientific process involves debates about 
cognitive values and philosophical theories. Cognitive 
values and philosophical theories are connected to 
our worldview more generally. This indicates that 
sense-making and story-telling is part of science, 
too, although many scientists do not pay enough 
attention to the philosophical, religious or ideological 
implications of their theories. Like any hypothesis, a 
hypothesis concerning emplotment should be made 
vulnerable to refutation and qualification, and open to 
the probative force of empirical evidence. The narrative 
hypothesis involved in scientific explanations and 
12 E.g. Philip E. Tetlock, “Theory-Driven Reasoning about 
Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures in World Politics: Are We 
Prisoners of Our Preconceptions?,” American Journal of Politi-
cal Science 43, no. 2 (1999), 335-66.
13 See e.g. Larry Laudan, Science and Values: The Aims of 
Science and Their Role in Scientific Debate (Berkeley, CA: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1984).
anticipations can be tested by various empirical and 
conceptual means. Do the elements of the story and 
their order correspond to what really has happened, 
is happening, or will happen? Hypotheses can be also 
tested at a more generic level, in terms of coherence 
and conceptual and theoretical plausibility, or in terms 
of their existential hypotheses (e.g. do the assumed 
entities, relations and mechanisms really exist?). 
Hypothesis-testing is not mechanistic, but requires 
interpretation and situated judgement.14 
Because of the dependence of hypothesis-testing 
on interpretation and judgement, what is required 
is a strong ethics of scientific research. The basic 
realist manifesto is that “as scientists, that is members 
of a certain community, we should apportion our 
willingness or reluctance to accept a claim as worthy 
to be included in the corpus of scientific knowledge to 
the extent that we sincerely think it somehow reflects 
the way the world is”15. Science follows critical public 
procedures of verification and falsification, which are 
different from those of mere speculative imagination. 
Yet scholars are also involved in the (re)production 
of social realities. As there can be no single decisive 
tests between theories, rationality and openness to 
learning become ethical and political matters also 
in a sense that goes beyond the mere virtue of truth. 
This point has to do with the ontology of time and 
temporality. The past is, in part, undetermined, 
and at some level will remain so. The meaning and 
characteristics of an event, episode or process depend 
on how the relevant processes turn out. For the same 
14 A further complication is that it is possible that the same 
material can be ordered according to different actual or poten-
tial terminal consequences. All these temporal interpretations 
can be true with regard to the causal powers and sequences upon 
which they are elaborated. There may thus be many coherent and 
plausible stories to tell on the basis of the same material. See 
Heikki Patomäki, After International Relations: Critical Realism 
and the (Re)Construction of World Politics (London: Routledge, 
2002), 141.
15 Rom Harré, Varieties of Realism: A Rationale for the Natu-
ral Sciences (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 89.
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reasons, we must rely on future-oriented narratives to 
describe contemporary events and on-going processes, 
the end of which can only be seen from a vantage point 
later than the moment of reflection or action within 
that process.16 
The future, in turn, can only be studied in terms of 
scenarios of possible and likely futures. The future is 
real but not yet determined and our activities – including 
scholarly activities – take part in co-determining future 
events and episodes, potentially shaping processes at 
various scales of time.17 Processes are open-ended 
and flowing, with one process capable of sliding into 
another, and with smaller processes combining to form 
larger processes. Reflexive involvement implies also 
ethical and political responsibility. The recognition of 
our ethical responsibility about the choice of stories is 
compatible with the scientific realist manifesto.
The basic mythologems of modern liberal-capitalist 
societies
In both natural and human sciences, the more 
canonical or dramatic the outcome of the story, the 
more appealing the story usually becomes. We know 
from psychological and social-psychological studies 
that missing links are quickly filled in with elements 
adopted from the pre-existing mythical and ideological 
scripts. More often than not, anticipations based on 
simple canonical or dramatic stories vastly inflate 
the likelihood of the expected course of events and 
processes.18 Misleadingly canonised, generalised and 
16 For a fuller account, see Heikki Patomäki, “On the Comple-
xities of Time and Temporality: Implications for World History 
and Global Futures,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 
57, no. 3 (2011), 339-52.
17 See also Heikki Patomäki, “Praxis, Politics and the Future: A 
Dialectical Critical Realist Account of World-Historical Causati-
on,” Journal of International Relations and Development 20, no. 
4 (2017), 805-25.
18 Thomas Gilovich, How We Know What Isn’t So: The Falli-
bility of Human Reason in Everyday Life (New York: The Free 
Press, 1991); Philip E. Tetlock, Expert Political Judgement: How 
inflated stories can serve as constitutive mythologem 
of a given social order (within which researchers 
operate), though they are also contested.
Arguably, the basic myth of liberal-capitalist 
societies of the late 20th century and early 21st 
century comprises three mythologems and temporal 
tiers: (i) the first tier is constituted by cosmic myths 
of desperation, involving the Copernican principle 
– “we don’t occupy a privileged position in the 
universe”19 – and various narratives about how the 
story of humanity will inevitably end up in death, at 
some scale of time20; (ii) the second tier is motivated 
by cosmic desperation and involves a conviction that 
the spheres of life and culture either are or should 
be highly competitive, resulting in Darwinist or pro-
market theories and ideologies21; (iii) the third tier 
Good Is It? How Can We Know? (Princeton: Princeton Universi-
ty Press, 2005), chs 2 and 3.
19 Astrophysicist Brandon Carter, in his contribution to a 1973 
symposium honouring Copernicus’s 500th birthday, criticised 
over-reliance on the Copernican principle: “Although our situa-
tion is not necessarily central, it is inevitably privileged to some 
extent”. Brandon Carter, “Large Number Coincidences and the 
Anthropic Principle in Cosmology,” in Confrontation of Cosmo-
logical Theories with Observational Data, ed. Malcom Longair 
(International Astronomical Union, 1974), 291-8, accessed July 
11, 2018, http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1974IAUS...63..291C. 
20 German scientist Rudolph Clausius claimed in the 1860s 
that everything will end in “heat-death” (Wärmetod). The second 
law of thermodynamics says roughly that entropy within closed 
systems should gradually become maximal and disorder should 
eventually reign. Entropy is a measure specifying the amount 
of disorder or randomness or something similar in a system that 
contains energy or information. Despite the confidence of Wes-
tern scientific establishment in the truth of this gloomy cosmic 
story, the meaning and scope of the second law is ambiguous. 
Entropy has many meanings and we do not even know whether 
cosmos is a closed system. For a critical discussion on the de-
velopment of the second law of thermodynamics, see Peter A. 
Corning and Stephen Jay Kline, “Thermodynamics, Information 
and Life Revisited, Part I: ‘To Be or Entropy’,” Systems Research 
and Behavioural Science 15, no. 4 (1998), 273-95.
21 In popular imagination, this mythologem is evident for ins-
tance in fictions about encounters with extra-terrestrial others 
depicted as evil beasts. In these stories, ETs are either as slaves 
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consists of belief in the blessings of technological 
progress and economic growth generated by capitalist 
market economy, providing sources of enjoyment and 
pleasure to us humans in our – and perhaps also in our 
children’s – lifetimes.22
These ideas have deep philosophical roots. 
The allegedly value-neutral technical methods of 
empiricist science entail thorough scepticism about 
anything metaphysical or normative. God or values 
have no place in science. In the 18th century, David 
Hume explained that we should trust only our sense 
perceptions and be sceptical of anything else such as 
religious texts.23 The sceptical sentiment grew stronger 
in the 19th century. Friedrich Nietzsche was among 
the first to fully articulate the devastating impact of 
empirical science on culture and civilization.24 God 
is dead! We are alone on this insignificant planet. 
Nietzsche proclaimed further that no universal 
perspective is possible. Christianity, Kantianism, and 
of their passions or mindless followers of their genetically pro-
grammed codes of behaviour, independently of how technologi-
cally advanced they may be. For a critical analysis, see Heikki 
Patomäki, “Dialectics of Civilizations: A Cosmic Perspective,” 
in Alker and IR: Global Studies in an Interconnected World, ed. 
Renée Marlin-Bennett (London: Routledge, 2008), 87-101.
22 Recently, this optimistic tier of the liberal-capitalist world-
view has been defended by Steven Pinker, Enlightenment Now. 
The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism and Progress (Lon-
don: Penguin Books, 2018); and Hans Rosling (with Ola Rosling 
& Anna Rönnlund) Factfulness: Ten Reasons We’re Wrong about 
the World – And Why Things Are Better than You Think (London: 
Sceptre, 2018).
23 Hume was not consistent in his attitude towards religion or 
morality; he also wrote things like “the whole frame of nature 
bespeaks an intelligent author”; quoted in John C.A. Gaskin, 
“Hume on Religion,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, 
ed. David Fate Norton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 320. Although the fear of censorship and consequences 
might have led Hume to write contradictory statements, as a con-
sistent sceptic Hume was unable and unwilling to deny the exis-
tence of God.
24 For Nietzsche’s three phases and his diverse and ambiva-
lent pursuits, see Maudemarie Clark, “Nietzsche, Friedrich,” in 
The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward 
Craig (London: Routledge, 2005), 726-41.
utilitarianism are mere slave-moralities; we should 
be looking for something better. What is coming in 
the history of the next two centuries is the “advent of 
nihilism”.25 What Nietzsche really meant has been a 
source of endless discussions, but his prophetic texts 
clearly stress the nihilistic undercurrents of empirical 
science and modernity.
Contemporary cosmic myths of desperation are told 
in terms of theories of astrophysics, chemistry and 
theory of evolution. Nothing really matters, because 
most of things we see and experience are ultimately 
mere illusions. Even time and causation are not really 
real. Rather, the world is atemporal and mathematical. 
Usually only claims that can be expressed in the 
language of mathematics are truly scientific. The 
language of mathematics is technical, neutral and 
value-free. 
Moreover, the origin of everything, the Big Bang, is 
itself a meaningless event. It may well be that numerous 
black holes produce new universes; or alternatively 
the universe may have emerged from nothing at all, 
for instance due to arbitrary quantum effects. The 
universe as a whole may be moving towards a heat-
death or some other ultimate end-as-death, perhaps 
due to the ever-accelerating expansion of space. But 
also in shorter scales of time, the end looks inevitable. 
The solar system will come to an end with the life-
cycle of the Sun; the Sun may collide with some 
other cosmic object; and the Earth may have only 500 
million years left in the habitable zone of the system. 
Meanwhile, our planet seems constantly vulnerable to 
all sorts of cosmic and internal natural catastrophes. 
Finally, it seems increasingly likely that we humans 
will destroy ourselves already in the course of the 21st 
century.26 The story is basically the same epic tragedy 
– without heroes – at all scales of time, from cosmic 
25 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kauff-
man and Reginald John Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1968), 
3.
26 Martin Rees, Our Final Century: Will Civilisation Survive 
the Twenty-First Century? (London: Arrow Books, 2004).
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to human.
Empiricism (positivism) relies on instrumentalism 
about knowledge. Knowledge is seen as something 
that can be used to control the world. Cosmic 
desperation associated with empiricist philosophical 
doctrines encourages short-termism and technical 
and preference-maximising orientation to the world. 
Moreover, empiricism tends to go hand in hand 
with reductionism (e.g. physicalism, biologism, 
individualism).27 Repeatedly cosmic desperation 
has been connected with Darwinist ideologies, 
although desperation may also trigger an existentialist 
commitment to any ideology – such as nationalism or 
statist socialism – providing at least some hope about 
a better world, however unrealistic that may be given 
the underlying premises.28 Most characteristically, 
however, the modern cosmic myths of desperation 
and their sceptical and empiricist underpinnings have 
27 For a consistent empiricist, what exists is “my sense-expe-
riences”. The objects of these sense-experiences are atomistic 
events. Other perceiving individual minds may be allowed to 
exist as well. This kind of empiricist ontology encourages epis-
temological reductionism (e.g. physicalism, biologism, indivi-
dualism). For example in neoclassical economics, there is a ten-
dency to reduce macroeconomics to microeconomics focussing 
on individual decision-makers; to use psychology to explain why 
individuals are what they are; and to use socio-biology to explain 
psychology. 
28 An interesting case is Louis Althusser, whose commitment 
to the true meaning of Marx’s theory, his “anti-humanism”, and 
his loyalty to the Communist Party despite its hierarchies, exclu-
sions and violence can be read as an existentialist ethico-politi-
cal commitment in an otherwise nihilist world. Five years after 
killing his wife, Althusser wrote memoirs where he exclaims his 
desperation and repeats, in a Freudian language, many of the 
points made by Nietzsche, “Does one have to point out that, in 
addition to the three great narcissistic wounds inflicted on Huma-
nity (that of Galileo, that of Darwin, and that of the unconscious), 
there is a fourth and ever graver one which no one wishes to have 
revealed (since from the time immemorial the family has been 
the very site of the sacred and therefore of power and of reli-
gion). It is an irrefutable fact that the Family is the most powerful 
ideological State apparatus.” Louis Althusser, The Future Lasts 
Forever: A Memoir, trans. Richard Veasey (New York: The New 
Press, 1993), 104-105. 
supported ideas about competition of individuals and 
firms as the foundation of modern market society.29 
Scepticism, combined with the reduction of the 
necessary and the possible to the actual, generates 
among other things ‘there is no alternative’ thinking30 
and the tendency to write Whig-histories about the 
inevitable progress towards the present31. Reductionism 
suggests either value subjectivism (though individuals 
may of course behave morally for whatever arbitrary 
reasons) or outright moral nihilism. 
A critique of the prevailing mythologeme: there is 
an alternative 
From a methodological point of view, the prevailing 
29 This attitude is formalized in mainstream neoclassical eco-
nomics, which revolves around the concept of “perfect compe-
tition”. Ben Fine summarizes its development: “[All t]his was 
done through an extraordinary reductionism in which all else was 
sacrificed in order to obtain the desired results, an implosion of 
homo economicus upon itself”. Ben Fine, “Neoclassical Econo-
mics: An Elephant Is Not a Chimera but Is a Chimera Real,” in 
What Is Neoclassical Economics? Debating the Origins, Mea-
ning and Significance, ed. Jamie Morgan (London: Routledge, 
2015), 186.
30 As Roy Bhaskar explains: “Ontological reductionism tran-
sposed to the human zone has particularly damaging consequen-
ces. In perfect resonance with the empiricist concept of science 
as a behavioural response to the stimulus of given facts and their 
constant conjunctions, society is conceived as composed of in-
dividuals, motivated by given desires and conjoined (if at all) 
by contract. Reason is reduced to the ability to perform an opti-
mizing or satisficing operation and freedom consists in its unim-
peded exercise. [….] It is the ideology of the market place and 
more generally of the established order of things, of TINA (there 
is no alternative).” Roy Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality: A Critical 
Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy (1989; repr., London: 
Routledge, 2011), 10.
31 Herbert Butterfield developed this concept in his The Whig 
Interpretation of History (London: G.Bells & Sons, 1959, orig. 
published 1931). According to Butterfield, the Whig history leads 
very quickly to the division of the world into supporters and op-
ponents of the story of progress toward the present, goodies and 
baddies, and the narrative of heroes from this perspective. Pinker 
and Rosling, mentioned in note 22, are contemporary examples 
of Whig-histories.
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scientific stories about the ultimate fate of humanity 
seem to involve various fallacies and misleading 
assumptions. Most common are (i) the assumption of 
closed systems and (ii) overconfidence on the currently 
prevailing scientific theories. Both are rooted in the 
empiricist (positivist) philosophy of science, which 
is moreover self-nullifying in denying causal agency 
and its role in science.32 Moreover, over-reliance on 
mathematics can further feed the sense of certainty 
encouraging dogmatism.
In reality, systems are open. Open systems interact 
with causal processes not confined within them and 
often involve qualitative changes and emergence. The 
openness of systems means that everything is historical 
and evolving, (possibly) including even the laws of 
physics. New constellations, properties and powers 
can emerge. Moreover, science is historical, processual 
and open-ended. It is dependent on the antecedently 
established facts and theories, paradigms and models, 
methods and techniques of inquiry. For a particular 
scientific school or scientist, these provide the material 
from which new ideas, theories etc are forged. On 
that basis researchers produce – in a particular geo-
historical context – new facts and theories, paradigms 
and models. The process of scientific change does not 
leave earlier conceptualisations intact. Something is 
lost and something new is created.33 In some sense 
Newtonian mechanics may describe a special case of 
the theory of relativity, but the latter includes also a 
novel conception of space-time (in general relativity, 
the effects of gravitation are ascribed to spacetime 
curvature instead of a force). The ultimate nature of 
space and time remains disputed in contemporary 
science.
Many contemporary scientists proclaim that there is 
nothing special about this universe of ours. It is a mere 
32 See Roy Bhaskar, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipa-
tion (London: Routledge, 2009), 8, 16-19, 32, 71, 153. 
33 For a deeper and more sophisticated account, see Bhaskar, 
Scientific Realism, 47-62 [note 32].
result of a cosmic lottery or some sort of Darwinist 
selection. There are countless (if not an infinite 
number of) disconnected universes; this one of ours 
just happens to be life-friendly, and only for the time 
being.34 The process of biological evolution is arbitrary; 
humanity is an accidental outcome. A key problem 
with speculations about cosmic selection or lottery 
is that these presuppose the existence of something 
that probably can never be observed. Thereby they 
also radically multiply beings, thus violating even 
the most cautious and qualified interpretation of 
Ockham’s razor (to which empiricism and positivism 
are committed).35 Although it is in principle possible 
that this line of line of research will yield falsifiable 
hypothesis at some point, a further problem is that 
failure to verify predictions can be easily explained 
away at no cost to the speculation, given the indirect 
nature of possible hypotheses.36 Application of the 
Copernican principle or Darwinism to speculative 
universes can thus be misleading. A risk of relying on 
speculations about countless universes is that science 
comes to be replaced, quite unreflexively, with stories 
derived merely from traditional myths and ideology. 
We can now start to see why scenarios about an 
inevitable end-in-death are rather implausible from a 
scientific point of view, however appealing as stories 
(according to Isaac Asimov “the conviction that the 
whole universe is coming to an end […] is an old 
one, and is, in fact, an important part of Western 
tradition”37). Scenarios about what will happen in 
34 For different but insightful discussions, see for instance Paul 
Davies, The Goldilock’s Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right 
for Life? (London: Allen Lane, 2006), ch. 8; Martin Rees, Before 
the Beginning: Our Universe and Others (London: Simon and 
Schuster, 1997), 251–69; Leonard Susskind, 2006. The Cosmic 
Landscape: String Theory and the Illusion of Intelligent Design 
(New York: Little, Brown and Co., 2006), 293–376.
35 See Heikki Patomäki, “After Critical Realism? The Rele-
vance of Contemporary Science,” Journal of Critical Realism 9, 
no. 1 (2010), especially n. 81, 83-4.
36 Lee Smolin, Time Reborn (London: Penguin Books, 2014), 
250.
37 Isaac Asimov, A Choice of Catastrophes: The Disasters that 
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the next thousands, millions, or billions of years are 
speculative and the more so, the further we reach. 
There are two reasons for this: the openness of systems 
(ontology) and the open-ended nature of the process 
of scientific learning (epistemology). There are thus 
ontological limits to the predictability of cosmic 
futures. Epistemologically, the purpose of science is 
not to produce timeless dogmas; rather science is an 
open-ended process characterised by differences of 
opinion, pluralism and learning. In both ways, the 
future is open.38
The tacit assumption of projecting long-term futures 
on the basis of currently accepted scientific theories 
Threaten Our World (London: Arrow Books, 1981), 13.
38 Systems are always open and closed only to a degree. Future 
can be analysed in terms of conditional and more or less likely 
possibilities of becoming. The closer we get to a given point in 
the future, the more shaped and structured it is. Moreover, it is 
possible to assess the intersubjective-qualitative probability of 
different scenarios and revise our scenarios in light of new evi-
dence and developments. Heikki Patomäki, “Exploring Possib-
le, Likely and Desirable Global Futures: Beyond the Closed vs. 
Open Systems Dichotomy,” in Scientific Realism and Internatio-
nal Relations, ed. Jonathan Joseph and Colin Wight (Palgrave: 
London, 2010), 147-166.
is that time will leave those theories intact. Many 
scientists seem unable or unwilling to take on board 
the lessons of the history of science as a changing and 
evolving social practice, to see themselves as part of 
a long process of scientific developments. However, 
in a mere 1/1000th of a million years our science 
and technology is bound to look very different. Just 
imagine how our science and technology will look, 
say, in the 32nd century. The future developments are 
likely to accord with Arthur C. Clarke’s famous three 
laws39:
1. When a distinguished but elderly scientist 
states that something is possible, she is 
almost certainly right. When she states 
that something is impossible, she is very 
probably wrong.
2. The only way of discovering the limits of 
the possible is to venture a little way past 
them into the impossible.
39 Discussed in Arthur C. Clarke, ”Hazards of Prophecy: The 
Failure of Imagination,” in Profiles of  the Future: An Inquiry 
into the Limits of the Possible (London: Indigo, 2000), 19-26. 
Empiricism / positivism / Nietzsche Critical realism / pragmatism
• Value-neutral technical methods of empiricist 
science  skepticism about anything metaphys-
ical or normative, but often scientist certainty 
about science.
• God is dead! We are alone on this insignificant 
planet!
• Knowledge is a tool of control and power.
• Changes are non-real, illusionary or minimal.
• Reductionism  tendency toward atomism.
• Reason is reduced to the ability to perform an 
optimizing or satisficing operation; and freedom 
consists in its unimpeded exercise.
• Open systems & emergence is real  history is 
open-ended
−	 science itself is an open-ended process
• Everything is historical and evolving, including 
our agency, will and intentions 
−	 rationality is normative & things matter   
ethical and political learning
• Freedom can be increased by replacing unnec-
essary (and often misrepresented) sources of 
causal determination with more wanted and 
needed sources 
−	 self-determination – good life
• History is not meaningless; the rational telos of 
history is dialogical and evolves with history.
• Change & emergence in world society: transfor-
mative political agency.
Table 1: Ideal-typical philosophical differences (logos)
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3. Any sufficiently advanced technology is 
indistinguishable from magic.
When new scientific possibilities are opened up and 
new advanced, “magic-like” technologies developed 
(enabling also new paths of research), scenarios about 
our cosmic fate at different scales of time are very 
likely to change.
An alternative mythologeme: the power of life and 
culture 
It is possible to use our imaginative capacities 
to develop alternative and scientifically and 
mythopoetically more plausible storylines.40 In 
this section, I present a life- and culture-oriented 
storyline that accords at least as well with the findings 
of contemporary science as the liberal-capitalist 
storyline. Similarly to the latter, the alternative can 
be understood as an attempt to build a coherent and 
plausible story out of somewhat diverse elements, that 
is, as an ideal-type.
To begin with, the currently standard version of the 
Big Bang theory is unlikely to be the last word. The 
homogeneity of the cosmic background radiation is 
habitually interpreted as evidence for a singularity and 
the subsequent period of huge cosmic inflation at the 
beginning of the universe. However, if time did not 
start then, there are plausible alternative explanations 
(and new ones can be created in the course of future 
scientific processes). For instance, in the beginning 
of this universe, there may have been no point of 
singularity from which everything began, but rather 
40 For an overview of alternative views, for instance those 
developed by Kant, Hegel, various critical theorists and Ame-
rican pragmatists such as Peirce and James, see Zachary Stein, 
“Beyond Nature and Humanity. Reflections on the Emergence 
and Purposes of Metatheories,” in Metatheory for the Twen-
ty-First Century: Critical Realism and Integral Theory in Dialo-
gue, ed. Roy Bhaskar, Sean Esbjorn-Hargens, Nicholas Hedlund 
& Mervyn Hartwig (London: Routledge, 2015), 35-68.
some continuity from a predecessor universe.41 There 
are also many other reasons to think that time is real, 
continuous and non-finite, and also as global and 
irreversible.42 
Moreover, in this alternative story, our cosmos is 
singular and unique. There is only one universe at a 
time. While laws of physics may appear stable in the 
contemporary cooled-down universe, they are not im-
mutable (if and when the relational structures change, 
so do laws). Causation, emergence and change are 
real. Everything is historical and evolving. Hence, 
physics and chemistry could well learn a few things 
from geology, life sciences and human sciences.43 
Moreover, emergent layers such as conscious experi-
ence, agency, will and intentions are real and causally 
efficacious.
41 ”If the singularity is absent, then the sufficient reason for 
choices of initial conditions and laws may lie in the world before 
the big bang.” Roberto M. Unger and Lee Smolin, The Singular 
Universe and the Reality of Time (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2015), 402.
42 The preferred cosmic time is not absolute (like it was for 
Newton) but relational. In a relational spacetime theory space is 
dependent on the relations between bodies; and time is dependent 
on events and processes. The preferred cosmic time is determin-
ed through the shape dynamics of the whole. Shape dynamics is 
an approach that has advanced during the 2010s and has a phy-
sical arrow of time due to the growth of complexity and the dy-
namical storage of locally accessible records of the past. Julian 
Barbour, Tim Koslowski and Flavio Mercati, “Identification of 
a Gravitational Arrow of Time,” Physical review letters 113, no. 
18 (2014). 181101. Cosmic time in this sense is consistent with 
the relativity of simultaneity in any local regions of spacetime. 
Unger and Smolin, The Singular Universe, 188, 420-1 [note 41]. 
Carlo Rovelli accepts that it is possible to distinguish the time 
that guides the rhythm of processes from a real universal time, 
and thus writes that “the point of view of Smolin, Ellis and Ma-
roun is defensible”. Rovelli, however, accuses Smolin of forcing 
the world to adapt to our intuition and contrasts that with “what 
we have discovered about the world”. This is a petitio principii, 
however. The question that remain open is: what is it that we 
have discovered about the world? Carlo Rovelli, The Order of 
Time (London: Allen Lane, 2018), 190-1, n.14.
43 See Unger and Smolin, The Singular Universe [note 41].
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Life is not only real but it has generated new 
emergent powers on Earth and possibly elsewhere. 
Cosmologists have come to realise that complexity, 
life and billions of years of evolution in stable 
environment require very specific circumstances. For 
instance, all four basic forces of nature are in many 
ways implicated in the life story. Changing the strength 
of any of them, even by a small amount, could render 
the universe sterile. To give a more specific example, 
if certain very specific nuclear resonances in the 
nuclear physics of carbons were a little different, then 
the heavier elements could not build up in the interiors 
of red giant stars. The universe would contain only 
hydrogen and helium, and life would be impossible. 
The list is long.44
Overall, our singular and unique cosmos seems 
hospitable to life, although interpretations about 
the meaning and extent of this hospitality vary.45 A 
44 See e.g. Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the 
Universe Just Right for Life? (London: Allen Lane, 2006), 151-
71; or Martin Rees, Our Cosmic Habitat (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2017). 
45 Interestingly, Unger and Smolin, The Singular Universe, 
531-2 [note 41] disagree about the extent to which the universe 
can be seen as hospitable to us. They agree that mostly nature is 
plausible alternative storyline about the future of the 
cosmos revolves around life and its possibilities rather 
than death. This account does not exclude individual 
death or the possibility of a collective catastrophe, 
but it stresses reflexivity about the poetic aspect of 
catastrophe-stories. The Greek word katastrophē 
meant “to overturn” or “turn upside down”. In dramas, 
the catastrophe is the final resolution or climax in a 
poem or narrative plot, which brings the piece to a 
close. Although the word “catastrophe” has come to 
be associated with tragic endings rather than with 
happy ones, in a comedy the climax is a happy ending. 
It is only in tragedy that the climax of the story means 
indifferent about us; that each individual is going to die; and that 
reverence for the universe is unhealthy power worship. Smolin 
stresses, nonetheless that their “natural philosophy” is also a bea-
rer of good news. Neither we nor the universe is computational 
and our experiences accord with the nature of reality. We are part 
of the whole of nature and cosmos. Christian de Duve in turn 
shares the agnosticism of Unger and Smolin and yet argues that 
“available clues support the assumption that our universe is such 
that generation of life was obligatory, probably in many sites and 
at many times”. Our universe is “pregnant with life”. Christian 
De Duve, “How Biofriendly is Our Universe?,” in Fitness of the 
Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning, ed. John D. 
Barrow et.al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
194-5.
Account 1: 
Meaninglessness and illusions prevail
Account 2: Reality involves life, 
consciousness and active agency
•	 Big Bang: original singularity, possibly coming 
out of nothing, was also the beginning of time.
•	 The Big Bang itself is a meaningless and arbi-
trary event
−	 numerous black holes produce new universes 
 multiverse/Darwinism
−	 alternatively the universe may have emerged 
from nothing at all, due to arbitrary quantum 
effects
•	 Cosmos is indifferent or hostile to us humans.
•	 Ultimately time and causation are illusions; and 
agency is illusionary, redundant or marginal.
•	 There is only one universe at a time; reasons for 
the choices of initial conditions and laws lie in 
the world before the big bang.
•	 Time, causation, emergence and change are real; 
making also life possible.
•	 Cosmos is hospitable to life, although inter-
pretations about the meaning and extent of this 
hospitality vary.
•	 Emergent layers such as conscious experience, 
agency, will and intentions are also real and 
causally efficacious.
Table 2: Contrastive accounts about the beginning and nature of cosmos
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the death of the hero (possibly together with many 
others). What is also important is that tragedy has a 
future-oriented purpose. The unexpected discoveries 
and sudden turns can generate a purifying or clarifying 
katharsis among the audience46, perhaps even some 
metaphysical comfort through experiencing human 
sacrifice in art47. Katharsis can thus be seen as a form 
of comfort; correction to excessive emotions such as 
pity or fear; or restoration of psychic health.
Comedy is life- and future-oriented. Comedy can 
be understood as the mythos of spring: the story of 
a new, better society replacing the old, absurd one. 
In comedy, there can be misunderstandings, illusions 
and actions with unforeseen consequences and some 
characters can also be represented in satirical light, 
but in the end things tend to turn out fine. Moreover, 
tragedies and comedies can also be mixed in various 
ways.48 Although nothing truly terrible happens in a 
tragicomedy, the end often involves unfulfilled desires 
and tragic feelings of the impossibility of a fully 
happy ending. This may bring tears – perhaps in the 
midst of laughter – to the eyes of the spectator. For 
these reasons, comedy is perhaps the most humane 
of the three main genres of narratives and plays. It 
involves the likelihood of a happy ending, but does 
not exclude the possibility of unfulfilled desires or 
tragic outcomes.49
46 Aristotle was of the opinion that tragedy must be simple and 
thus a well-constructed plot involves only a single catastrophe. 
“In the second rank comes the kind of tragedy which some place 
first. Like the Odyssey, it has double threat or plot, and also an 
opposite catastrophe for the good and the bad.” Aristotle, Poe-
tics, intro by Francis Fergusson (New York: Hill & Wang, 1961), 
XIII, 77.
47 This was early Nietzsche’s interpretation of Greek tragedy, 
which he proposed as a solution to the question “how can we 
overcome nihilism?”. See Julian Young, The Death of God and 
the Meaning of Life (London: Routledge, 2003), 44-56.
48 See Riikka Kuusisto, “Comparing IR Plots: Dismal Trage-
dies, Exuberant Romances, Hopeful Comedies and Cynical Sati-
res,” International Politics 55, no. 2 (2018), 160-176.
49  I compare different possible story-lines concerning the futu-
re of global political economy and security in Heikki Patomäki, 
Consider for instance internal and cosmic planetary 
catastrophes (violent earthquakes or volcanic 
eruptions, major asteroid or comet impacts) that seem 
to threaten our future. These are rare phenomena and 
their risks can be addressed by means of future-oriented 
planetary co-operation. Over time, our technological 
and organizational capacities to tackle these and other 
dangers will increase.
The danger of self-destruction in the course of 
the 21st century seems more serious, for instance by 
means of weapons of mass destruction or ecological 
collapse. The possibility of a tragic global military 
catastrophe is real and appears once again, after the 
end of the Cold War, increasingly likely. Disintegrative 
tendencies and processes of conflict-escalation prevail 
due to the current constellation of forces in global 
political economy. They may be gradually assembling 
conditions for an ever bigger crisis – or a full-
scale global catastrophe. Yet there is also a rational 
tendential direction to world history, more firmly 
based than contingent events and processes.50
The rational tendential direction is grounded 
in collective human learning. Three elements of 
rationality constitute the tendential directionality of 
world history. The first is truth, involving criticism of 
falsehoods and attitudes that sustain falsehoods. The 
second concerns overcoming contradictions through 
collective action and common institutions. Lastly, the 
third involves normative universalizability and our 
capacity to resolve social conflicts. Transformations 
toward a rational tendential direction is not automatic, 
it is realized through transformative praxis, which 
depends among other things upon the rationality 
of participating actors. The minimal meaning of 
rationality is openness to reason and learning. 
The Political Economy of Global Security: War, Future Crises 
and Changes in Global Governance (London: Routledge, 2008), 
217-21.
50 See Heikki Patomäki, Disintegrative Tendencies in Global 
Political Economy: Exits and Conflicts (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2018).
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Once context-specific learning has occurred and a 
reasonable concrete direction set, the next logical step 
is the process of constructing transformative agency 
and building better common institutions to transform 
conflicts and tackle common problems.51
Our cultural evolution has created also other 
problems. Since the industrial revolution, human 
activities have affected biosphere and climate on a 
planetary scale. So far, the consequences have been 
negative, as shown by the mass-extinction of species 
and anthropogenic global warming. Yet the role of 
humanity may well be more life promoting and ethical 
in the future. A global climate regime has been in the 
making for a quarter of a century now. The flaws and 
deficiencies of the Kyoto Protocol and Paris UNFCCC 
Agreement notwithstanding, the gradual and troubled 
evolvement of climate governance indicates how the 
futurized nature of the present is changing. Reflexive 
self-regulation occurs through increased knowledge 
about the way natural and social systems work and 
51 Patomäki, Disintegrative Tendencies, 116-27 [note 50]; see 
also Heikki Patomäki, “Emancipation from Violence through 
Global Law and Institutions: A Post-Deutschian Perspective,” in 
Pacifism, ed. Johan Kustermans, Timothy Sauer, Didier Lootens 
and Barbara Segaert (Palgrave MacMillan: London, 2019).
generate effects, not only now, but also in the future.52 
Global climate governance is an attempt at reflexive 
self-regulation that consciously aims at homeostasis 
by regulating the planetary environment. The aim is to 
maintain a relatively constant temperature to counter 
the effects of greenhouse gases. This process will 
take time; a lot depends on the timing of adequate 
responses.
While constrained by real natural processes and 
social structures, the planetary future does not just 
happen but becomes increasingly something that 
various actors – including “we”, whoever this we may 
refer to – make of it. There is also a deeper, a more 
cosmic aspect to this transformation. James Lovelock 
developed a controversial hypothesis in the 1960s and 
1970s according to which the systems of life form a 
complex interacting system that maintains itself in the 
long run, through homeostatic feedback loops, life-
friendly climatic and biogeochemical conditions on 
52 For a general account about how the futurized nature of the 
present is changing, see Heikki Patomäki “On the Complexities 
of Time and Temporality: Implications for World History and 
Global Futures,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 57, 
no. 3 (2011), 339-352.
Preferred storyline 1: tragedy (end) Preferred storyline 2: (tragi)comedy
• The story is basically the same epic tragedy 
without heroes at all scales of time.
−	 tragedy without katharsis
• A possible interpretation of katharsis: some 
(desperate) metaphysical comfort through 
experiencing human sacrifice in art (as in early 
Nietzsche).
• The sense of tragedy is typically combined with 
a Whig history about inevitable progress to the 
present (a typical story involves instrumentalist 
accounts of science, rationality as optimization, 
hedonism, and consumerism).
• Ultimate end in death.
• Explanations of different outcomes, episodes 
and processes call for different plots and their 
combinations.
• Katharsis can be seen as a form of comfort; 
correction to excessive emotions such as pity or 
fear; or restoration of mental and social health.
• Tragicomedy: contingent developments, the end 
often involves unfulfilled desires and sense of 
impossibility of a fully happy ending.
• Comedy is humane because it involves the pos-
sibility of happy ending, but does not exclude 
tragic outcomes or unfulfilled desires.
• History is open, stories continue.
Table 3: Ideal-typical contrastive plots (mythos)
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Earth.53 However, both Gaian (negative) and non-Gaian 
(positive) feedbacks are likely to evolve in response 
to global warming. Hence, there is no automatic 
homeostasis, at least not in the scale of 102 of years or 
less.54 If there is to be homeostasis, it must be created 
by means of conscious, future-oriented interventions 
into the ways in which our socio-economic systems 
work and are shaping Earth’s climate and biosphere. 
We humans have come to be deeply involved in 
Earth’s future developments. Earth has nurtured life 
for a long time, continuously for more than three 
billion years. In a sense, the planet is now becoming 
conscious of itself through the gradual rise of human 
reflexive self-regulation aiming at maintaining life-
friendly climatic and biogeochemical conditions. What 
is more, reflexive self-regulation may contribute to 
improving the underlying social conditions of ethico-
political learning. Collective learning reflexively 
shaping our common planetary conditions and the 
direction of world history as a whole can mean, 
among other things, that the sphere of human freedom 
is gradually widening – a process that may have much 
wider significance. The degree of freedom can be 
increased by replacing particular unnecessary and often 
misrepresented causal sources of determination with 
more wanted, needed and better-understood sources 
of causal determination, classically implying attempts 
to increase one’s autonomy as self-determination.55 
These are steps in “the long march of mankind toward 
its unity and better control of its own fate”56.
From the point of view of grand narratives, what 
53 James Lovelock, “Gaia as seen through the Atmosphere,” 
Atmospheric Environment 6, no. 8 (1972): 579-80; see also Ja-
mes Lovelock, “Hands Up for the Gaia Hypothesis,” Nature 344 
(1990), 100-2.
54 James Kirchner, “The Gaia Hypothesis: Fact, Theory, and 
Wishful Thinking,” Climatic Change 52, no. 4 (2002), 391-408.
55 Bhaskar, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, 115 
[note 32].
56 In the words of the Keynesian economist Robert Triffin, Our 
International Monetary System: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow 
(New York: Random House, 1968), 179. 
is interesting is the possibility that emergent layers of 
life and culture may gradually assume an increasingly 
important role in the process of cosmic evolution. 
Biological reality is multi-layered, hierarchically 
organized and involves interdependent functional 
synergies and higher-level controls, making 
purposive behaviour and, ultimately, also culture and 
consciousness possible. Complex systems of life have 
shaped the chemical composition and development of 
planet Earth for more than three billion years, setting it 
to a current path of development that is systematically 
off its non-living physical state of existence. The Earth 
is blue because it is teeming with life. 
By cautiously generalising from the experiences 
of the Earth, it is conceivable that in the future life 
and consciousness will play a (co-)formative role 
in our galaxy and possibly even in the universe as a 
whole. From this perspective, British-born theoretical 
physicist and mathematician Freeman Dyson has 
proposed a vision that is best read as a plausible 
counter-hypothesis to the heat-death scenario: 
The greening of the galaxy will become an 
irreversible process. […] The expansion of 
life over the universe is a beginning, not an 
end. At the same time as life is extending 
its habitat quantitatively, it will also be 
changing and evolving qualitatively into new 
dimensions of mind and spirit that we cannot 
now imagine.57
This scenario of the greening of the galaxy sets 
a future project for humanity; the expansion of life 
and culture into space may be one of the chief tasks 
awaiting humankind. There may be other sentient and 
conscious beings, but even in that case, the greening 
of the galaxy would occur through cultural and 
technological means in a post-biological universe.58 
This implies that the future of cosmos is not only about 
57 Freeman Dyson, Disturbing the Universe (New York: Basic 
Books, 1979), 236-7.
58 Steven J. Dick, “The Postbiological Universe and Our Futu-
re in Space,” Futures 41, no. 8 (2009), 578-80.
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expansion of life but also about society and culture, 
about ethics and politics. More than that, structures 
and processes at that level of reality can create new 
dimensions of mind and spirit, through collective 
learning of humankind (and other species).
Pragmatism and critical scientific realism encourage 
cosmic hopefulness, thereby facilitating scientific 
learning and progress. Astrobiology will be a key area 
of learning in the next few decades and centuries. We 
are likely to learn much more about the conditions and 
determinants of life in the universe.59 This learning will 
shape our future-scenarios and assessments of their 
plausibility. Whereas the prevailing mythologeme 
of liberal-capitalist societies is characteristically 
associated with parametric (environment is seen 
as fixed in relation to one’s individual choices) and 
strategic modes of consciousness (other subjects are 
recognised only as strategic players and the point 
remains to optimise under constraints)60; in this 
59 Steven J. Dick, Astrobiology, Discovery, and Societal Im-
pact (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
60 For these modes, see Jon Elster, Logic and Society (Chiches-
ter: John Wiley & Sons, 1978), ch 5.
alternative mythologeme, actors: 
• recognise each other as equal subjects 
positioned in social relations.
• are capable of recognising social ills and 
contradictions at the level of wholes. 
• and are capable of organizing collective 
actions and building common institutions 
to absent ills and overcome contradictions.
Cosmic hopefulness encourages attempts to build 
trust, solidarity and ethico-political commitments. 
Successful organization of collective action requires 
communication to feed the development of trust and 
solidarity. Success in these endeavours is contingent on 
agency and eco-socio-historical conditions. Because 
of contingency, success is not guaranteed: negative 
outcomes are possible. In this alternative mythologem, 
types of plots can be combined in many ways to 
understand particular episodes or processes. A happy 
ending is in no way guaranteed but achievable, even if 
it may involve unfulfilled desires and tragic feelings of 
loss. Hopefulness can exhibit itself at different scales 
of time. Some outcomes may be negative, tragic and 
There is no alternative (TINA) Emancipatory transformations are possible
• Skepticism, combined with the reduction of the 
necessary and the possible to the actual (‘actual-
ism’), generates ‘there is no alternative’ thinking
o this is also the origin of Whig-histories
• Reductionism suggests either value subjectivism 
(though individuals may behave morally for 
whatever arbitrary reasons) or outright moral 
nihilism.
• Reductionism turned into ideology of markets 
and established order of things (of TINA, there 
is no alternative).
• Life and society are about competition: 
Darwinism – market-society – capitalism.
• Some improvements may be possible, but 
only within the prevailing institutional liberal-
capitalist order.
• The rational tendential direction of world history 
is grounded in collective human learning. 
• Three elements of rationality constitute the ten-
dential directionality of world history:
1. Truth, involving criticism of falsehoods 
and attitudes that sustain falsehoods. 
2. Normative universalizability and our ca-
pacity to resolve social conflicts. 
3. Overcoming lacks, contradictions etc 
through collective action and common 
institutions (revising old building & new 
institutions). 
• The possibility of development of new 
cooperative capacities, needs and ethico-political 
horizons (“new dimensions of mind and spirit 
that we cannot now imagine”).
Table 4: Ideal-typical ethico-political differences
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even terminal in relation to a particular process or 
processes; while wider processes will always persist. 
The more a hopeful story stresses the negative, tragic 
and terminal phases, the closer it gets to Christian 
and Marxian eschatology; and thereby it becomes 
more liable to accepting unnecessary suffering and 
violence.61
Analysing and assessing the Big History storyline 
At first look, the current version of BH appears 
consistent with the life- and learning-oriented 
storyline. David Christian’s grand narrative about 
our origins is meant to stand in for the role played by 
mythical narratives in early human societies.62 The 
idea is that deep stories are important in establishing 
meaning and identity. Ethical and political projects 
derive their motivation from the sense they render 
to our lives. The explicit purpose of BH is to help to 
establish a widespread awareness of belonging to a 
planetary whole.63 The hope is that the modern cosmic 
story of our origins will forge a global we-feeling and 
61 For example, Wagar’s A Short History of the Future (3rd 
edition, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999) involves a 
nuclear war in the 2040s and the death of seven billion people. 
The scenario is based on the assumption that only a tragic global 
catastrophe can spell an end to the system of nation-states and 
capitalist world economy and lead to global-democratic transfor-
mation. Ironically, the nuclear war of 2044 means a happy ending 
to the process of global warming. In this story, transformative 
agency lies in a world political party. In the 2050s, there is a 
debate in the party between the pluralists, preferring non-violent 
methods and the possibility of staying outside the World Com-
monwealth, and the Leninists. The Leninists carry the day. The 
world is united under a democratic-socialist world state, but at 
the expense of an additional three million casualties.
62 World history, world systems theory and related attempts 
have preceded and paralleled Big History in Christian’s sense. 
For a brief history of Big History, see David Christian, “What 
is Big History?,” Journal of Big History 1, No:1 (2018), 4-19 
(available at http://dx.doi.org/10.22339/jbh.v1i1.2241).
63 Already H.G.Wells’s Outline of History (originally publis-
hed in 1920) was explicitly motivated by a desire to unify huma-
nity in terms of a common planetary history located in a cosmic 
setting. 
cooperation in the world plagued by global problems. 
The bulk of this narrative concerns increasing 
complexity on the life-friendly planet Earth. New 
properties and powers come to being through major 
turning points. BH not only frames world history in 
cosmic terms and imagines a future world community, 
but it is also systematically critical of Eurocentrism and 
other forms of centrism. By evoking innovative myths 
about shared human existence and destiny, BH helps to 
articulate a rising global imaginary for transformative 
and progressive politics in the 21st century.64 BH 
appears thus committed to a transformative planetary 
vision and stresses the role of biological and cultural 
evolution and increasing complexity. 
However, a closer look reveals ambiguities. BH 
contains some elements from both storylines – and 
not in an entirely unproblematic way. This raises the 
question of whether it is possible that the BH tale 
could turn out to be counterproductive. At the deepest 
level, Christian and his co-authors seem committed to 
the standard version of the Big Bang cosmology as the 
last word of science so far, even if they are agnostic 
about the details of the origins of the universe: “We 
don’t really know what [the universe] came out of 
or if anything existed before the universe”. What is 
more certain is that when the universe emerged from 
“a vast foam of energy, it was extremely simple”.65 
These reservations and qualifications notwithstanding, 
Christian, Brown and other BH authors affirm the 
notion that the original singularity, possibly coming 
out of nothing, was followed by cosmic inflation. The 
wider cosmic context of the Big Bang is a multiverse 
64 Heikki Patomäki, and Manfred Seger, “Social Imaginaries 
and Big History: Towards a New Planetary Consciousness?,” Fu-
tures 42, no. 10 (2010). 1056-63; Heikki Patomäki, “On the Pos-
sibility of a Global Political Community: The Enigma of ‘Small 
Local Differences’ within Humanity,” Protosociology. An Inter-
national Journal of Interdisciplinary Research 33, no. 1 (2017), 
93-127.
65 David Christian, Origin Story: A Big History of Everything 
(London: Allen Lane, 2018), 11.
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or Darwinist selection of universes.66 This is the first 
tier of the liberal-capitalist myth.
For non-experts in cosmology, it is of course 
reasonable to rely on the currently prevailing scientific 
opinion, even when it is non-consensual. It is beyond 
reasonable doubt that the early universe was radically 
smaller and much simpler than the current universe. 
Reliance on the standard Big Bang theory satisfies 
some requirements of a reasonable appeal to scientific 
authority.67 However, claims about the beginning of 
time, multiverse and Darwinist selection of universes 
are speculative. Whatever evidence there may be 
is usually circumstantial and indirect at best. The 
hypothesis of cosmic inflation seems to accord well 
with the evidence (especially background radiation), 
but rival hypotheses can explain the same evidence.68 
Moreover, we know that also evidence-based scientific 
theories are open to change and that scientific expert 
opinion can be driven by sense-making and story-
telling. While it goes without saying that we cannot 
settle scientific disputes at the philosophical or 
mythological level only, differences at that level matter, 
especially in contexts where evidence is ambiguous 
and there are competing hypotheses, theories and 
speculations.  
BH is an impressive achievement, and yet it 
66 Christian, Maps of Time, 22-25 [note 1]; Christian, Origin 
Story, 20-5 [note 64]; Christian, Brown and Benjamin, Big Histo-
ry, 14-20 [note 1]; Cynthia Stokes Brown, Big History: From the 
Big Bang to the Present (New York: The New Press, 2007), 4-7.
67 Out of the six requirements specified by Douglas Walton, 
only two seem problematical, namely consistency (“is the claim 
in question consistent with what other experts assert?”) and evi-
dence (“is expert X’s assertion based on solid evidence?”). In 
the frontiers of cosmology, experts tend to disagree, often wildly 
so, and evidence is typically circumstantial and strongly theo-
ry-laden, often based on mere (other) theories and mathematical 
models. Douglas Walton, Informal Logic. A Pragmatic Approach 
(Second edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 217-
222. 
68 See Unger and Lee Smolin, The Singular Universe [note 
41], 402.
can be argued that the theoretical and practical 
commitments of BH are not entirely consistent. 
Firstly, BH is in important part motivated by the 
“sense of disorientation, division and directionless” 
that characterises our modern world.69 BH criticizes 
excessive specialisation and fragmentation of sciences 
and humanities. Christian writes daringly about “a 
return to the goal of a unified understanding of reality, 
in place of the fragmented visions that dominate 
modern education and scholarship”.70 However, many 
prevailing theories and speculations about the origins 
and nature of the universe stem from theories that 
contradict the views and aims of BH. In its current 
mainstream form, science is habitually premised on 
reductionism. This is evident for instance in numerous 
attempts to develop a theory of everything (“a set of 
equations capable of describing all phenomena that 
have been observed, or that will ever be observed”).71 
What is more, the abstract logical time of mathematical 
theories in fields ranging from physics to economics 
turn time into a quasi-spatial dimension and represent 
reality as atemporal or at least ahistorical. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, BH, as 
articulated so far, seems to share several end-in-
death scenarios with the liberal-capitalist worldview. 
Entropy will increase and space expand until a few 
“lonely beacons of light will find themselves in 
a galactic graveyard”72 – and finally these lonely 
beacons will perish too. The end of our solar system 
will come much sooner and well before that, the Earth 
will become uninhabitable. “It will be as barren as the 
Moon is today”73. The account of possible and likely 
human futures at 102 scale of time is more balanced. 
Colonization of other worlds – if we ever succeed 
reaching other solar systems – may make humanity 
69 Christian, Origin Story, 8 [note 65].
70 Christian, “What is Big History?” 4 [note 62].
71 For a criticism of this reductionist programme by well-kno-
wn physicists, see R. B. Laughlin & David Pines, “The Theory of 
Everything,” PNAS 97, no:1 (2000), 28-31.
72 Christian, Maps of Time, 489 [note 1].
73 Christian, Maps of Time, 487 [note 1].
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less dependent on Earth. Meanwhile, while it is “easy 
to imagine catastrophic scenarios brought about by 
nuclear or biological warfare, or ecological disaster, 
or perhaps even a collision with a large asteroid”, 
also a progressive outcome of history is possible. “It 
is the in-between scenarios that are both most likely 
and most difficult to imagine.”74 Even a hesitant 
commitment to the unfounded cosmic mythologeme 
of meaninglessness and inevitable end-in-death can 
easily become counterproductive in relation to the 
ultimate aims of BH.
Thirdly, at a practical and ideological level, the 
problem lies in the presumption that in spite of all the 
specialisation and fragmentation, science is on the 
side of an enlightened and progressive cosmopolitan 
vision. In reality science is interwoven with the global 
problems, both practically (e.g. as part of military-
industrial complex or ecologically unsustainable 
systems of production and consumption) and 
ideologically (including through the propagation 
of mythologems that encourage consumerism and 
competitive behaviour)75. To use Thomas Kuhn’s 
terminology, a typical scientist does “normal science”, 
working within a settled – and typically empiricist 
– framework, leaving the conceptual, social and 
political framework unchallenged. The results of his 
or her work can easily be adapted to any technical 
purpose, including profit- or war-making.76 This 
is especially true in a world where the university 
has been repurposed in terms of success in global 
competition of corporations and states; usefulness 
74 Christian, Maps of Time, 482 [note 1]; Christian, Origin Sto-
ry, 289 [note 65] formulates the same point in perhaps slightly 
less pessimistic terms and mentions, on 294, also the possibility 
of emergence of a “new world society that preserves the best of 
the Good Anthropocene”.
75 Cosmic desperation associated with empiricist (positivist) 
doctrines encourages short-termism and technical-utilitarian 
orientation to the world, clearly against the point of Big History.
76 In his interesting book, Steve Fuller portrays Kuhn as the 
official philosopher of the US military-industrial complex. Steve 
Fuller, Kuhn vs. Popper: The Struggle for the Soul of Science 
(Thriplow: Icon Books, 2006), 32, 123. 
for money-making; and corporate-style efficiency.77 
The repurposing of the university has deepened these 
problems. According to for example Martin Rees, a 
British cosmologist and Astronomer Royal, many 
plausible 21st century catastrophe-scenarios stem 
from scientific developments. “In the present century 
the dilemmas and threats will come from biology and 
computer science, as well as from physics.”78 Among 
other things, this raises the question whether ethical 
constraints should be set on science and whether 
science should be slowed down. An instrumentalist and 
acquiescent science should not be trusted uncritically, 
especially under the current political conditions.
Frederick Jameson has remarked that it seems 
easier nowadays to imagine the end of the world than 
the end of a particular social system, capitalism.79 BH 
appears close to the mainstream also in this regard. 
Interpretations of recent and contemporary history 
reinforce constraints on imaginative capacities. The 
history of the Soviet Union, for instance, suggests 
“that overthrowing capitalism may be an extremely 
destructive project” and unlikely to succeed in its own 
aims (egalitarianism, ecological sustainability). While 
Christian is truly concerned about rising inequalities 
and the possibility of ecological destruction, he also 
assumes that inequalities will remain a problem as 
long as capitalism remains dominant. Moreover, 
inequalities can “generate conflicts that guarantee the 
77 See for example James H. Mittelman, Implausible Dream. 
The World-Class University and Repurposing of Higher Educati-
on (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018); for a vision 
for the future, see Heikki Patomäki, “Repurposing the University 
in the 21st Century: Toward a Progressive Global Vision”, Glo-
balizations, 16 no.5 (2019), 751-762.
78 Rees, Our Final Century, 40 [note 26].
79 Fredrik Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future: The Desi-
re Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions (London: Verso, 
2005), 199. Unlike Christian, for instance Brown does not even 
mention capitalism in the context of her future-scenarios (alt-
hough discusses capitalism in the historical part). With regard 
to the future, she focusses entirely on environmental questions 
abstracted away from political economy institutions; Brown, Big 
History, 230-46 [note 66].
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eventual use of the destructive military technologies 
now available to us”.80 The hope lies in mitigating 
some of the consequences of capitalism. Taxes and 
subsidies can be used to steer economic activities 
toward more sustainable directions. The living 
standards of subordinate classes may rise in even the 
world’s poorest countries. Perhaps capitalist peace 
will prevail in the end.81 The argument seems to rely, 
after all, on economic growth.
I am not implying that BH must include a story about 
the end of capitalism and beginning of something that 
will replace it. That scenario would mean a commitment 
to Marxism or some other deep-structure social 
theory that believes in a compulsive, world-historical 
sequence of stages of social organization (perhaps 
following the mythical sequence of Armageddon 
 Millennium  New Jerusalem), with each stage 
representing a type of society from a closed list of 
possible frameworks (such as feudalism, capitalism 
and socialism).82 Rather BH should develop its 
understanding of historical development and change 
in terms of collective learning, transformative agency, 
experimentation and concrete utopias83.
The problem is that currently BH is rather cautious 
and ambivalent about the needed and desired 
ethico-political direction. Our current institutional 
arrangements are not the necessary outcomes of some 
80 Christian, Maps of Time, 478-81 [note 1].
81 E.g. Erich Weede, “Economic Policy and International Se-
curity: Rent-Seeking, Free Trade, and Democratic Peace,” Euro-
pean Journal of International Relations 1, no:4 (1995), 519-537.
82 For a strong criticism of the ‘closed list of possible fra-
meworks’ thinking, see Robert Mangabeira Unger, Politics: The 
Central Texts: Theory against Fate, ed. and intro. by Zhiyuan 
Cui, (London: Verso, 1997), 33-41 et.passim.
83 Ernst Bloch introduced the concept of concrete utopia in his 
The Principle of Hope that was published successively in three 
volumes in 1954, 1955, and 1959. The term has been adopted by 
various critical theorists. The term u-topia is a bit misleading, 
however, as it means a place nowhere. A positive, hope-inspiring 
counterpart to dystopia is actually eutopia, which could be trans-
lated as ‘a good place’ (or: a place enabling human flourishing).
unspecified organizational, economic, or psychological 
constraints. Rather new ethical and political are likely 
to emerge in response to the problems that have 
emerged because of the acceleration of our cultural 
evolution. How will the future then turn out? Many 
key questions are pushed aside or left unanswered. 
Will production be robotized and automatized 
entirely; or will production be based on free voluntary 
association of citizens, perhaps serving purposes 
we cannot anticipate now? Does money or property 
continue to exist?84 How will increasing longevity and 
our moral learning shape intimate relations?85 Will 
the ever-more sophisticated technologies be put in the 
service of some dystopian purposes or do they open 
up new possibilities for democratic participation? 
What about the future of war and violence? If the 
current trends continue, war and violence will have 
become virtually absent already in the 2200s, if not 
sooner.86 Can nuclear weapons and other weapons of 
mass destruction be abolished? Will there be any need 
for people specializing in violence? Will geopolitical 
states be replaced by a new functionalist system or by 
world state – or rather, will all states wither away?87
84 For an example of a serious contemporary proposal to make 
property conditional, temporary and democratic, see Unger, Po-
litics, esp. 306-95 [note 82]. Unger has been an influential politi-
cian in Brazil. Also the idea that there is no money resonates with 
popular imagination, even if unnoticed in mainstream politics. 
For instance, for a discussion about the ambiguous politics of the 
post-capitalist Star Trek, see Dan Hassler-Forest, Science Fic-
tion, Fantasy, and Politics: Transmedia World-Building Beyond 
Capitalism (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 47-66.
85 For some speculations, see e.g. Wagar, A Short History [note 
61]; James L. Halpern, The First Immortal: A Novel of the Future 
(New York: Random House, 1998).
86 The claim about the declining role of violence is nowadays 
most often associated with Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of 
Our Nature: The Decline of Violence in History and Its Causes 
(London: Allen Lane, 2011). About actual and potential counter-
tendencies, see Patomäki, Disintegrative Tendencies [note 50].
87 Christian, Origin Story, 301 [note 65] mentions this ques-
tion but does not discuss it. For discussions from a variety of 
perspectives, see Cooperation & Conflict special issue, with int-
ro: Mathias Albert et al., “Introduction: World State Futures,” 
Cooperation & Conflict 47, no. 2 (2012), 145-56.
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Concrete eutopias establish a direction and 
normative telos to history. At any given world-
historical moment, there are some possible rational 
directions of world history. Over time, there will be 
a succession of such moments. Setting a direction 
is a matter of dialectical discussions and debates, 
always occurring under concrete world-historical 
circumstances. This is what the openness of world 
history means. Any claim about rational tendential 
directionality of world history has to be understood 
as a dialectical argument within the meaningful 
human sphere.88 Rationality cannot be confined to any 
particular agents or collective category. Once context-
specific learning has taken place and a reasonable 
direction been set, the next logical step is the process 
of constructing transformative agency. The question of 
transformative global agency concerns rationality and 
developments that may take decades. The making of a 
collective agency is a process of active and reflexive 
engagement within the world in which we seek to 
achieve the unity of theory and practice in practice.89 
Transformative praxis has to be processual, 
developmental and directional, involving political 
programmes specifying aims and concrete eutopias. 
Its organisational forms must be compatible with these 
requirements. The transformative praxis itself can 
be transformed on the basis of past experiences and 
criticism of them. In the globalised world of the 21st 
century, there is a quest for new forms of agency such 
as world political party.90 While a rational direction 
88 See Heikki Patomäki, “On the Dialectics of Global Gover-
nance in the 21st Century: A Polanyian Double Movement?,” 
Globalizations 11, no. 5 (2014). 751-68; Patomäki, Disintegrati-
ve Tendencies, 116-27 [note 50].
89 Roy Bhaskar, Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom (London: 
Verso, 1993), 8, 158-61.
90 Key questions of a global party-formation include: how 
would it be possible to combine (i) the capacity to establish an 
overall, binding direction to the activities of the party with (ii) 
a democratic process of will-formation that also maximises its 
learning capacity? Heikki Patomäki, “Towards Global Political 
Parties,” Ethics & Global Politics 4 no. 2 (2011), 81-102, freely 
available at http://www.ethicsandglobalpolitics.net/index.php/
can be set, debated and disputed, world history is 
open-ended and, because of our capacity to create 
something new, unanticipatable. For all imaginable 
purposes and beyond, humanity’s time for its desires 
and projects can be virtually infinite. World history is 
just about to begin. 
As H.G.Wells put it, according with the spirit of 
pragmatism, critical realism and visionaries such as 
Freeman Dyson: “The past is but the beginning of 
a beginning, and all that is and has been is but the 
twilight of the dawn”. A story portraying the present 
as “the twilight of the dawn” is more hopeful and 
inspirational than a gloomy story about us humans 
marching toward some inevitable end at some scale 
of time. As Wells proclaimed: “All this world is heavy 
with the promise of greater things.”91
Conclusions
In this paper, I have argued that contemporary 
science is consistent with at least two different 
storylines. The basic mythologems of contemporary 
liberal-capitalist societies – verging on cosmic 
desperation – tend to be in line with market 
globalism92. They are, however, instrumentalist and 
can easily submit to any demands to provide means 
for some ends (or be simply indifferent about the use 
of scientific knowledge). The prevailing narrative is 
largely and in most time-scales oriented toward a tragic 
end, thus undermining hope for collective learning and 
progress. Empiricist science tends to feed into a sense 
egp/article/view/7334; and for a call for such a party, see Heikki 
Patomäki, “A World Political Party: The Time Has Come”, GTI 
essay, February 2019, available at https://www.greattransition.
org/ publication/world-political-party.
91 H. G. Wells, The Discovery of the Future (New York: 
B.W. Huebsch, 1913), 60, https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Re-
cord/001188090.
92 For the concept of market globalism, see Manfred Steger, 
Globalisms: The Great Ideological Struggle of the Twenty-First 
Century (3rd ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009).
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of disorientation, division and directionless. Attitudes 
can vary from indifference to reality to outright 
scepticism and escapism to fantasy-worlds such as 
imagined parallel quantum worlds (or sport, soap and 
nostalgia). Freedom in this mythologeme consists 
of unimpeded exercise of optimizing behaviour. 
Consumerism results from the absence of hope and 
good life.
The alternative storyline, revolving around life and 
learning and involving cosmic hopefulness, starts 
from the idea that time, space, causation, emergence 
and change are real. Cosmos is historical and evolving, 
and it is also hospitable to life. Over time, life has 
generated new emergent powers on Earth; it may have 
done so also elsewhere in the universe. A key point 
is that emergent cultural layers such as conscious 
experience, agency, will and intentions are real and 
causally efficacious. This makes scientific practices 
and transformative ethico-political activities possible. 
The rational tendential direction of world-history is 
grounded in our collective human learning, making it 
possible to solve problems, absent ills and overcome 
contradictions by means of collective actions and by 
building better common institutions. 
I have argued above that the storyline of Big 
History is ambiguous in problematic ways, while 
not all complexities of our stories are undesirable. 
Explanations of different outcomes, episodes and 
processes call for different plots and their combinations. 
The point is that the life-oriented storyline involves 
also the possibility of happy endings and new 
beginnings. It cultivates the idea that the past as we 
know it may be just the beginning of a beginning. In 
this epic story involving humankind, the Earth as a 
whole is now becoming conscious through the gradual 
rise of human reflexive self-regulation aiming at 
maintaining sustainable life-friendly biogeochemical, 
climatic and socio-economic conditions. What is 
more, reflexive self-regulation may contribute to 
improving the underlying social conditions of our 
ethico-political learning. The conditions of free 
development of any particular human being are social 
and thus involve deep interconnectedness. Collective 
learning – shaping reflexively our common planetary 
conditions and the direction of world history as a 
whole – can mean, among other things, that the sphere 
of human freedom is gradually widening. This process 
of human emancipation can have cosmic significance, 
also because the expansion of life and culture into 
space may be a task awaiting humanity. 

